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A discussion regarding social 
identity theory and discursive 
psychology. 
 
By Damian E M Milton 
 
As soon as a person is born they are ascribed social groupings in which to belong, from the 
family to social categories such as gender and religious background.  How people act within 
group contexts has long been a fervent area of debate within social psychological research.  
A variety of perspectives have analysed both intergroup (between groups) and intragroup 
(within group) processes.  This essay examines two such approaches: the cognitive social 
model proposed by social identity theory (SIT), (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and the discursive 
social psychological (DSP) critique of this approach made by Billig (2002).  Both perspectives 
analyse the tendency of ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƚŽĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĞƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶƚŽ ‘ƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŵ ? ?
Thus, the role played by social categorisation and how people identify with these categories 
is highlighted, however, they disagree regarding the foundations of social categories and 
how they operate.  As Brown (2007) states in the title of this essay, SIT can be said to see 
group membership as primarily related to individual cognitive processes.  In contrast, Billig 
(2002) proposes that groups are sustained and reproduced in everyday talk and constitute 
discursive practices. 
 
Cognitive social psychologists suggest that social categories and identities are internalised in 
the minds of individual people, yet they often differ concerning the influence of social 
processes.  Much American experimental research emphasised cognitive processing, where 
the relationship between the individual and groups was seen in individualistic terms.  Brown 
(2007) however criticises this approach, for placing participants into improbable situations 
that lack ecological validity.  In contrast to the American tradition, the now dominant 
approach of TĂũĨĞůĂŶĚdƵƌŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?9) SIT originated within a European tradition that gave 
greater emphasis to social processes in the formation of identity. 
 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) attempted to depart from the previously ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ‘ďůŽŽĚ-and-ŐƵƚƐ ?
model, that depicted groups as having a negative influence disrupting the rationality of the 
individual.  In the building of their approach, Tajfel and Turner (1979) reference Adorno ?Ɛ et 
al. (1950, cited in Tajfel and Turner, 1979 ?ǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁ
individual psychological processes can lead to prejudicial beliefs and discriminatory actions 
toward others.  Tajfel and Turner (1979) ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ^ŚĞƌŝĨ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ?, 
cited in Tajfel and Turner, 1979 ?  ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐŐƌŽƵƉĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?  ?Zd ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐ a social 
approach to group conflict, suggesting that conflict arises between groups over scarce 
resources.  Therefore,  ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ animosity and 
antagonism between them, yet also cohesion within groups in times of competition that 
promote a heightened sense of integration into and identification with, the group.  These 
approaches only highlight the individual-society dualism in much social psychological 
theorising however, and although Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggested that they did not want 
to supplant RCT, but supplement it, they also drew attention to its weaknesses.  For 
example: not accounting for why individuals identify with a group.  Tajfel and Turner ?Ɛ
(1979) wished to bridge the macro-level concerns of sociology and political science with the 
micro-ůĞǀĞů ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŽĨ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇ ? ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ Ă ‘ŵŝĚ-ƌĂŶŐĞ ? ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ
the interdependence of the social and the psyche, thus rejecting the dominant American 
tradition of experimental methodology for lacking ecological validity and references to social 
factors. 
 
According to SIT, a universal feature of how individuals interact in and between groups is 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?^/dĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ
personal identity and their social identity (seen as a continuum).  In situations of conflict 
between groups, social identity is brought to the fore, rather than personal motivations.  
Similarly, Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that interactions between people lie on a 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵƵŵďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?  Conflicts nearer to the intergroup end 
of the spectrum that are not reducible to an objective basis are particularly difficult for RCT 
to explain.  It is suggested by SIT that the more an individual believes in the unchanging 
nature of the groups they belong to, the more likely they are to focus on their social and 
group identity and that of others.  The more an individual moves toward the social identity 
ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ? ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŝůů ďĞĐŽŵĞ  ‘ĚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ?  ?ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐ, 
 ‘ĚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƐĞĚ ? ? ? 
 
 ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ^/d ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŝŶŝŵĂů ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?  /Ŷ ƚŚĞƐĞ
experiments, participants are randomly assigned one of two groups that have no objective 
or material difference.  These experiments showed how all that is needed for in-group 
favouritism and discrimination to outsiders is being placed within a social category with the 
presence of an out-ŐƌŽƵƉ ?dĂũĨĞůĂŶĚdƵƌŶĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŵŝŶŝŵĂů ?ŐƌŽƵƉƐĂƌĞŽŶůǇŽĨĂ
cognitive nature and show the falsity of claiming group conflict must have a material social 
basis as RCT ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?^ŽĐŝĂůĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƐĞĞŶďǇ^/dĂƐĂĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ‘ƚŽŽů ? ?ƵƐĞĚƚŽĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇ
the social world, enabling the individual to undertake social actions.  Categories not only 
ĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ǇĞƚŽƌŝĞŶƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽǁĂƌĚĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶĞĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĂ
wider social nexus.  SIT suggests that there is a connection between group membership and 
ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƐĞůĨ-esteem and how they judge outsiders, due to cognitive biases produced 
by identification with a group.  An individual is thus seen by SIT to derive their social identity 
and self-image from the groups to which they belong.  Positive and negative attributions are 
made by people depending on their group membership that can be internalised by the 
individual in the formation of their self-image.   
 
dŚŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ  ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ ^/d ďǇ ĂŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĞƚĂů ĂŶĚ
cultural processes that can shape intergroup relations.  Evaluations of in-groups are made in 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?ŽƵƚ-groups.  For Tajfel and Turner (1979) selection of out-groups 
ĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶĂƌĞĚƵĞƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĂůŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǇĞƚĂƌĞ
internalised within cognitive processes through the personal need to highlight the 
distinctiveness of the in-group in order to support a positive self-image. 
 
For Tajfel and Turner (1979) there are a number of strategies that an individual can employ 
when they are socially classified as memberƐ ŽĨ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ůŽǁ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?  &ŝƌƐƚůǇ P  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů
ŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂĚŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĂŶŝŶ-group in order to try and pass from the 
low status group to one of a higher social status, although this strategy was likely to lead to a 
loosening of social ties within the subordinate group.  Indeed, it could be suggested that a 
ůŽǁůĞǀĞůŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƐƵĐŚ ? ĞůƉƐƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĐůĂƐƐĞƐŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
to undermine working class solidarity.  It can also be noted that many social categories are 
socially ascribed from birth, often with little chance for change (for example: gender or the 
ĂƐƚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƐƚƌĂƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƵƐĞĚŝƐƚŚĂƚŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂŶ
in-group redefine the comparisons made with others, reinterpreting negative connotations 
as positive attributes (for example: the civil-ƌŝŐŚƚƐƐůŽŐĂŶ ‘ůĂĐŬŝƐďĞĂƵƚŝĨƵů ? ? ?ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐ
made to high-status groups may wither in favour of competition with other groups of a 
similar status, due to a cognitive neĞĚƚŽďƵŝůĚ  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐĂŶĚŶŽƚĚĂŵĂŐĞƐĞůĨ-
esteem.  Tajfel and Turner (1979) note that conflict between subordinate groups are often 
more intense than conflicts between dominant and subordinate groups (having important 
ramifications for those wishing to raise a revolutionary consciousness amongst subordinate 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ DĂƌǆŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ &ĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƐ ? ?  ƚŚŝƌĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĨŽƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?
This strategy is the most openly political ĂŶĚ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ  ‘ĨŝǆĞĚ ? ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
gender  ? feminism).  Unfortunately however, this approach was not discussed in depth by 
Tajfel and Turner (1979).  From this theorising, they agreed with many social thinkers before 
them, that a level of social conflict was an inevitable feature of human life; yet instead of 
suggesting this was irrational behaviour, intergroup conflict arose out of a very rational 
human need for a positive self-image and the attainment of social resources and status. 
 
Despite Tajfel and Turner (1979) emphasising social factors influencing group membership, 
much SIT research since has largely been based on experimental research (Brown, 2007).  
Minimal group experiments lack ecological validity and do not resemble the way group 
membership is an active process saturated by social meanings.  Defenders of this method 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƵƐĞĨƵů ĨŽƌ ŝƐŽůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŵŝŶŝŵĂů ?
categorisation.  Although Tajfel and Turner (1979) wished to transcend traditional dualisms 
between theories looking at the individual as a main focus or society, SIT seems to have 
focused largely on individual cognitive processes and taken for granted the objective 
existence of social categories.  It could also be suggested that some social groups do not 
often have serious concerns of competition over resources and status, for example: a book 
club or a knitting circle.   
 
Billig (2002) offers a critique of SIT and suggests that a DSP approach is more able to account 
for the fluidity and complexity of social categories.  For Billig (2002), social categories are 
social constructions that gain social reality through the everyday talk of social actors, derived 
from discursive resources available in wider culture.  Billig (2002) agrees with Tajfel (1981, 
cited in Billig, 2002 ?ŝŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ďůŽŽĚ-and-ŐƵƚƐ ?ŵŽĚĞůŽĨŐƌŽƵƉƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚthat such 
ĂŵŽĚĞůĐĂŶŶŽƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂǆŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?ŽƌĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ
within individuals).  In order to explain war, Billig (2002) suggests that one must go beyond 
explanations of an aggressive biologically derived instinct and take account of social and 
historical conditions, involving the analysis of ideology and the wielding of social power.  For 
ŝůůŝŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^/dŝƐŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ?ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞdĂũĨĞůŚŝŵƐĞůĨhaving 
been a prisoner of war).  ŝůůŝŐ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ? ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ 
requires studying emotional (including unconscious) and ideological aspects of group 
identification ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ĂŶ  ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ŝŶ ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐŵ.  For Billig (2002), 
bigots will emotionally invest in the categories they use.  In extremes this can involve a 
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĨŽƌďŝĚĚĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ?ŽŶƚŽƚŚĞactions of others and even an enjoyment in the 
denigration of the other.   ŐŽŽĚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ  ‘ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇŚĂƚĞ
ĐƌŝŵĞ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ůŽǁ-status groups can become denigrated and dehumanised in the  ‘talk ? of 
others.  This could involve a projection/rejection of the  ‘other ? who occupies a subordinate 
 ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?  Billig (2002) argues that Tajfel (1969, cited in 
Billig, 2002 ?ƐŝŵƉůǇĐĂŶŶŽƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĨŽƌ ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚ  ‘ǁŝůĨƵůůǇƉĞƌǀĞƌƐĞ ? ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ ?
Not all discursive psychologists agree however.  Potter and Reicher (1987) question whether 
emotional  ‘talk ? is representative of an unconscious mental state; whilst Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) suggest emotions can be viewed as constructed in social discourse. 
 
Billig (2002) suggests that Tajfel (1969, cited in Billig, 2002) was mistaken in seeing 
categorisation as a cognitive constraint.  Contrastingly, from a discursive perspective, 
categorisation is seen as something that is achieved actively through the use of language in 
social interactions.  For Billig (2002), DSP offers a way to move beyond the individual-society 
dualism and account for how micro-level interactions are situated within wider social 
processes, without discounting cognitive and unconscious processes.  Social actors are seen 
by DSP to use categories flexibly, as speakers categorise and particularise meanings, as well 
as talking critically of the categories that they use.  Social categories used in interactions are 
also challenged by others and are evolving through this process (a dynamism unaccounted 
for in SIT).  hƐŝŶŐ^W ? ‘ĚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŶŽƚƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽƌƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ
ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞůĨ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌƐ ‘ĚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌin interactions. 
 
Brown (2007) argues that Tajfel and Turner (1979) see group membership as primarily a 
cognitive matter, as people are viewed as trying to maintain self-esteem rationally, by 
relating positive and negative attributions to group membership.  SIT suggests that self-
image is derived from social categories to which someone perceives they belong, whilst the 
selection of out-groups depends on social factors (not just material and objective 
differences).  In contrast, Billig (2002) using a discursive approach suggests that ideology and 
social categories are collectively produced and reproduced in interaction and are not an 
individual cognitive matter.  Prejudice is thus located within wider social relations of power. 
 
As Billig (2002) suggests, the cognitive focus of SIT is overly universalising and does not 
account for historical and social context.  Much like RCT, SIT cannot fully account for the 
 ‘ǁĂǆŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ or the extremes of bigotry.  It could be argued however, 
that the discursive approach highlights social aspects of the debate at the expense of the 
inner world of emotion and cognition.  Billig (2002) however, attempts to combine elements 
of SIT, with DSP and psychoanalytic concerns of emotion and the unconscious.  When trying 
to pick and choose elements of different theories to discuss a social phenomenon, it is 
important not to blindly follow an epistemologically bereft ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ  ‘ĐƵů-de-ƐĂĐ ?, of a 
 ‘ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŽĨ  ‘ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ǁŽƌŬƐ ďĞƐƚ ?  ?influenced by situational biases).  Billig 
(2002) however, shows the importance of how theories can complement each other and 
also critiques previously made (and dubious) claims.  It is clear from this critique of SIT, that 
group membership is not primarily a cognitive matter, but a discursive one.  It is still 
debatable however, to what extent prejudice, especially in extreme forms, is influenced by 
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